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Bridging	  Rationality	  and	  Accuracy1	  
Forthcoming	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  
	  
	   Rationality	  and	  accuracy	  have	  to	  be	  connected	  somehow.	  	  It’s	  not	  a	  coincidence	  that	  rational	  people	   tend	  to	  do	  a	  better	   job	   forming	  accurate	  beliefs	  and	  navigating	   the	  world	  than	  irrational	  people.	  	  But	  how	  are	  they	  connected?	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explore	  this	  question.	  	   The	   thought	   that	   some	   connection	  must	   exist	   between	   rationality	   and	   accuracy	   is	  certainly	   not	   a	   new	   one.	   Stewart	   Cohen	   notes	   that:	   “A	   variety	   of	   philosophers	   from	  Descartes	   to	   the	   present	   have	   presupposed	   the	   view	   that	   justification	   and	   truth	   are	  conceptually	  related	  –	  that	  there	  is	  an	  internal	  connection	  between	  a	  belief	  being	  justified	  and	  being	  true.”	  2	  	  But,	  he	  later	  concludes:	  “…it	  has	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  difficult	  matter	  to	  say	  precisely	  what	  the	  connection	  comes	  to.”3	  Although	   much	   of	   the	   debate	   about	   “the	   truth	   connection”	   has	   focused	   on	   its	  relevance	   to	   internalist	   and	   externalist	   theories	   of	   epistemology,	   two	   more	   recent	  movements	   in	   epistemology	  motivate	   serious	   reconsideration	  of	   the	   connection	  between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy.	  The	   first	   is	   the	   “accuracy	   first	  epistemology”	  project	  –	  a	  project	  aimed	  at	  deriving	  rational	  requirements	  from	  accuracy	  based	  considerations.	   	  The	  second	  is	  the	  higher	  order	  evidence	  debate,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  respond	  to	  evidence	  about	  our	  own	  rationality.	  	  	  In	   this	   paper	   I	   will	   outline	   two	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	   connection	   between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy	  and	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  what	  we	  say	  about	  higher	  order	  evidence	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  we	  think	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  connection.	  	   	  The	  higher	  order	  evidence	  case	  demonstrates	  a	  more	  general	  lesson	  for	  accuracy-­‐first	  epistemology:	  which	  first	  order	  views	   the	   accuracy-­‐based	   considerations	   motivate	   depends	   on	   what	   we	   think	   the	  connection	  between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy	  amounts	  to.	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The	  paper	  is	  structured	  around	  three	  questions:	  Preference	  Question	  #1:	  Why	  should	  we	  prefer	  rational	  credences	  to	  irrational	  credences?	  (This	  question	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  Sophie	  Horowitz4	  has	  called	  “the	  value	  question”).	  Preference	   Question	   #2:	   Why	   should	   we	   prefer	   credences	   rationalized	   by	   our	   total	  evidence	  to	  credences	  rationalized	  by	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  our	  evidence?	  Constitutive	   Question:	  What	   constitutive	   connection	   is	   there,	   if	   any,	   between	   rationality	  and	  accuracy?	  These	  questions	  will	  be	  made	  more	  precise	  as	  we	  proceed.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  I	  will	  make	  three	  assumptions:	  first,	  precision	  –	  the	  claim	  that	   (rational)	   agents’	   doxastic	   states	   are	   representable	   by	   precise	   credence	   functions;	  second,	  uniqueness	  –	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  unique	  function	  from	  evidence	  to	  doxastic	  states	   that	   assigns	   to	   each	  body	  of	   evidence	   the	  doxastic	   state	   that	   is	   rational	   given	   that	  evidence;	  and	  third,	  introspection	  –	  the	  claim	  that	  rational	  agents	  are	  always	  certain	  about	  what	  their	  evidence	  is.	  I	  do	  not	  endorse	  all	  of	  these	  assumptions,5	  and	  although	  I	  think	  that	  (a	  version	  of)	  the	  arguments	  I	  develop	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  available	  to	  those	  who	  reject	  these	  claims,	  I	  will	  not	  argue	  for	  this	  here.	  I	  will	  be	  satisfied	  if	  I	  can	  provide	  answers	  to	  my	  three	  questions	   that	  apply,	   at	  very	   least,	   in	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   rational	   response	   to	  evidence	   is	  unique	  and	  precise,	  and	  when	  agents	  are	  certain	  about	  what	  their	  evidence	  is.	  	  Here’s	   the	   plan:	   In	   section	   1,	   I	   make	   the	   preference	   questions	   more	   precise.	   	   In	  section	   2,	   I	   introduce	   one	   picture	   of	   how	   rationality	   and	   accuracy	   are	   connected.	   This	  picture,	   I	   will	   show,	   is	   presupposed	   in	   many	   accuracy-­‐based	   arguments	   for	   rational	  requirements.	  	  Roughly,	  it	  is	  one	  according	  to	  which	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  rationality	  is	  the	  
epistemic	   plan	   that	   one	   should	   regard,	   a	   priori,	   as	   the	   best	   plan	   (from	   an	   accuracy	  standpoint)	   to	   follow.	   In	   section	   3,	   I	   show	  why	   this	   picture	   is	   unavailable	   if	   one	   accepts	  certain	   commonly	   held	   views	   about	   higher	   order	   evidence	   (what	   are	   sometimes	   called	  “conciliatory”	   or	   “calibrationist”	   views).	   The	   remainder	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   devoted	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Horowitz,	  S.	  (2013).	  “Immoderately	  Rational.”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  167(1):	  1-­‐16.	  	  5	  Indeed	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   print	   against	   both	   precision	   (as	   applied	   to	   cognitively	   limited	   agents)	   and	  
uniqueness.	   	   (See	  my	   “Chilling	   out	   on	   Epistemic	   Rationality:	   A	   Defense	   of	   Imprecise	   Credences	   (and	   other	  imprecise	   doxastic	   attitudes),”	   Philosophical	   Studies	   (2012)	   158:197-­‐219	   and	   “Permission	   to	   Believe:	  Why	  Permissivism	   is	   True	   and	  What	   it	   Tells	   Us	   About	   Irrelevant	   Influences	   on	   Belief,”	  Noûs	   (2014)	   48(2):193-­‐218)).	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developing	   an	   alternative	  way	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	   connection	   between	   rationality	   and	  accuracy,	  which	  is	  not	  only	  consistent	  with,	  but	  motivates	  calibrationist	  views	  about	  higher	  order	  evidence.	  	  Roughly,	  the	  alternative	  account	  will	  be	  one	  according	  to	  which	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  rationality	  is	  the	  epistemic	  plan	  that	  one	  should	  regard,	  a	  priori,	  as	  the	  best	  plan	  (from	  an	  accuracy	  standpoint)	  to	  make.	  	  
1.	  Refining	  The	  Preference	  Questions	  	  
	   The	  goal	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  make	  the	  preference	  questions	  more	  precise.	  	  To	  begin,	  I	  need	  to	  introduce	  some	  terminology.	  	  
	  
(a)	  Epistemic	  Value	  (Accuracy)	  An	  epistemic	  value	   function	  (or	  scoring	  rule),	  A,	   is	  a	   function	  that	   takes	  as	   input	  a	  credence	  function,	  c,	  and	  a	  state	  of	  the	  world,	  s,	  and	  outputs	  a	  number,	  A(c,s)	  representing	  	  how	  accurate	  the	  credence	  function	  is	  in	  that	  state.	  	  
	  
(b)	  Expected	  Epistemic	  Value	  (Expected	  Accuracy)	  The	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  a	  credence	  function	  c	  is	  calculated	  relative	  to	  an	  epistemic	  value	  function	  A,	  a	  probability	  function	  p,	  and	  a	  partition	  of	  states	  S,	  as	  follows:	  	  	   EAA,p(c)	  =	  ∑	  p(s)A(c,	  s)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  s∈S	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  that	  p	  assigns	  to	  some	  credence	  function	  c	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  values	  c	  would	  have	  in	  states	  s,	  weighted	  by	  the	  probability	  that	  those	  states	  obtain.	  	  
(c)	  Credence	  Functions	  Under	  Descriptions	  	   Sometimes	  we’re	   interested	   in	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  a	  credence	  function	  under	  
some	  description.	   For	   example,	   I	  might	  want	   to	   calculate	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   Jane’s	  
credence	  function	  or	  the	  credence	  function	  I	  will	  have	  tomorrow	  even	  if	  I	  don’t	  know	  which	  credence	  functions	  satisfy	  these	  descriptions.	  The	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  a	  credence	  function	  under	  description	  D	  is:	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   EAA,p(D)	  =	  	  	  ∑	  	  p(s)A(D(s),	  s)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  s∈Sd	  	  where	  Sd	   is	   the	   set	  of	   states	   in	  which	  some	  credence	   function	  satisfies	  D,	   and	  D(s)	   is	   the	  credence	  function	  that	  satisfies	  D	  in	  s.	  In	  what	  follows	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  credence	  functions	  
specified	   as	   such	   and	   credence	   functions	   specified	   under	   a	   description	   will	   be	   important.	  	  When	   I	   talk	   about	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   a	   credence	   function	   specified	   as	   such	   I	   am	  assuming	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  credence	  function	  in	  question.	  	  (That	  is,	   the	   agent	   is	   aware	   that	   the	   credence	   function	   assigns,	   for	   example,	   credence	  0.1	   to	  p,	  credence	  0.72	   to	  q,	   and	   so	   forth).	   	   Lower	   case	   italicized	   letters	   are	  used	   as	   stand-­‐ins	   for	  credence	  functions	  specified	  as	  such.	  When	  I	  talk	  about	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  a	  credence	  function	   under	   a	   description,	   I	   leave	   it	   open	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   agent	   is	   aware	   of	   the	  identity	  of	  the	  credence	  function	  in	  question.	  	  	  	  
(d)	  Strictly	  Proper	  Value	  Functions	  	  	  	  	  There	  are	  many	  different	  epistemic	  value	  functions,	  and	  my	  arguments	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  use	  of	  any	  particular	  one.	  All	  I	  assume	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  value	  function	  is	  strictly	  
proper.	   Strictly	   proper	   value	   functions	   are	   ones	   according	   to	   which	   every	   probability	  function	   regards	   itself	   as	   more	   expectedly	   accurate	   than	   any	   other	   function	   specified	   as	  
such.	   	  This	  means	  that	  any	  probability	  function,	  f,	  will	  assign	  greater	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  itself	   than	   to	  a	  distinct	   function	  g.	   	   (However,	   it	  may	  regard	  as	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	  some	   other	   function	   specified	   under	   a	   description	   such	   as	   “the	   probability	   function	   that	  assigns	  1	  to	  all	  truths	  and	  0	  to	  all	  falsehoods.”)6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  motivation	   for	  using	  strictly	  proper	  scoring	  rules	   see	  Gibbard,	  A.	   (2008)	   “Rational	  Credence	  and	  the	  Value	  of	  Truth”	  Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Epistemology	  Volume	  2,	  Oxford	  University	  Press;	  Greaves,	  H.	   and	   Wallace,	   D.	   (2006)	   “Justifying	   conditionalisation:	   conditionalization	   maximizes	   expected	   epistemic	  utility”	  Mind	  115(459):	  607-­‐632;	  Horowitz,	  op.	  cit.;	  Joyce,	  J.	  (2009)	  “Accuracy	  and	  Coherence:	  Prospects	  for	  an	  Alethic	   Epistemology	   of	   Partial	   Belief”	   in	   F.	   Huber	   &	   C.	   Schmidt-­‐Petri	   (eds.),	   Degrees	   of	   Belief.	   Synthese	  Library.	  263-­‐29;	  Moss,	  S.	  (2011)	  “Scoring	  Rules	  and	  Epistemic	  Compromise”	  Mind	  120	  (480):1053-­‐1069	  and	  Pettigrew,	  R.	  (forthcoming)	  Accuracy	  and	  the	  Laws	  of	  Credence,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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I	  will	  now	  describe	  two	  principles	  aimed	  at	  making	  our	  judgments	  about	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  should	  prefer	  the	  rational	  to	  the	  irrational,	  and	  our	  total	  evidence	  to	  a	  subset	  of	  that	  evidence,	  more	  precise.	  The	  preference	  questions	  then	  become	  questions	  about	  why	  the	  two	  principles	  I	  describe	  are	  true	  (if,	  in	  fact,	  they	  are).	  
	   The	  first	  principle	  concerns	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  should	  prefer	  rational	  credences	  to	  irrational	  ones.	   	   I	  will	  set	  the	  stage	  by	  describing	  the	  case	  of	  Bill,	  a	  competitor	  on	  a	  game	  show.	  	   	  GAME	  SHOW	  1	  Bill	   is	  on	  a	  game	  show	  in	  which	  contestants	  make	  bets	  about	  tomorrow’s	  weather.	  Bill’s	   total	  body	  of	  evidence	   is	  E.	  Bill	  hasn’t	  being	  doing	  so	  well,	   so	   the	  host	  offers	  him	  a	  special	  deal:	  “In	  this	  round,	  you	  will	  be	  betting	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  will	  rain	  tomorrow	  (RAIN).	  I	  will	  give	  you	  a	  choice	  between	  a	  number	  of	  different	  pills.	  If	  you	  take	  the	  rationality-­‐pill,	  you	  will	  have	  the	  credence	  in	  RAIN	  that	  is	  rational	  given	  your	  evidence.7	  Alternatively,	   you	   can	   choose	   any	   number	   between	   0	   and	   1	   that	   you	  know	  is	  an	  irrational	  credence	  to	  have	  in	  RAIN	  given	  your	  evidence.	  	  I	  will	  then	  give	  you	  an	  irrationality-­‐pill	  that	  will	  make	  you	  have	  the	  credence	  corresponding	  to	  your	  choice.”	  	  Which	  of	  these	  two	  options	  should	  Bill	  choose?	  	  Plausibly,	  if	  Bill	  is	  trying	  to	  do	  well	  on	  the	  game	  show,	  he	  should	  pick	  the	  rationality	  pill.	  	  I	   will	   use	   “R(E)”,	   throughout,	   as	   a	   stand-­‐in	   for	   the	   description:	   “the	   rational	  credences	   given	   E”.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that,	   since	   R(E)	   is	   standing	   in	   for	   a	  
description,	  when	  I	  talk	  about	  an	  agent’s	  attitudes	  towards	  R(E),	   I	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  agent	  knows	  the	  identity	  of	  R(E).	  The	  judgment	  about	  Bill	  suggests:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Here,	   and	   throughout,	   I	   am	   talking	   about	   rationality	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   propositional	   rather	   than	   doxastic	  justification,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  problem	  with	  gaining	  a	  rational	  credence,	  in	  this	  sense,	  by	  taking	  a	  pill.	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RatPref	  (preference):	   For	   any	   body	   of	   evidence,	   E,	   if	   E	   is	   your	   total	   evidence,	   you	  should	  prefer	  R(E)	  to	  any	  function	  i	  which	  you	  know	  differs	  from	  R(E).8	  	  Prefer	  in	  what	  sense?	  	  At	  very	  least,	  the	  sense	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  your	  interest	  in	  doing	  well	  on	  game	  shows.	  	  More	  precisely,	  I	  will	  follow	  Allan	  Gibbard9	  in	  using	  “the	  guidance	  value”	  of	  a	  credence	  function	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  value	  of	  that	  credence	  function	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  choice	  in	  pursuit	   of	   other	   values.	   	   Gibbard,	   employing	   a	   result	   from	   Schervish,10	  shows	   that	   the	  credences	   with	   the	   highest	   guidance	   value	   are	   the	   credences	   that	   maximize	   expected	  
accuracy	  according	  to	  a	  strictly	  proper	  value	  function.11	  So	  we	  can	  also	  think	  of	  RatPref	  as	  the	   claim	   that	   you	   should	   assign	   greater	   expected	   accuracy	   (as	   measured	   by	   a	   strictly	  proper	  scoring	  rule)	  to	  R(E)	  than	  to	  i	  when	  you	  know	  that	  i	  differs	  from	  R(E):	  	  
RatPref	  (expected	  accuracy):	  For	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  E,	  and	  for	  any	  r	  such	  that	  R(E)	  =	  r,	   EAA,r(R(E))	  >	  EAA,r(i)	  Where	  r(R(E)	  =	  i)	  =	  0.	  	  RatPref	  (expected	  accuracy)	  says	  that	  if	  the	  rational	  credence	  function	  given	  E	  is	  r,	   then	  r	  will	   assign	   greater	   expected	   accuracy	   to	   the	   credence	   function	  under	  the	  description	   “the	  rational	   credences	   given	   E”	   than	   to	   any	   credence	   function	   specified	   as	   such	   which	   r	   is	  certain	  is	  irrational.	  	  Since	  the	  preference	  version	  and	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  version	  are	  so	  tightly	  connected,	  I	  will	  simply	  talk	  about	  “RatPref,”	  sometimes	  in	  terms	  of	  preferences	  and	  sometimes	  in	  terms	  of	  expected	  accuracy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Recall	  that	  I	  am	  assuming,	  throughout,	  that	  agents	  know	  what	  their	  evidence	  is.	   	  If	  this	  weren’t	  the	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  strange	  to	  think	  that	  a	  rational	  agent	  should	  give	  preference	  to	  R(E),	  when	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  that	  E	  is	  her	  evidence.	  9	  Gibbard,	  op.	  cit.	  10 	  Schervish,	   M.	   (1989)	   “A	   General	   Method	   for	   Comparing	   Probability	   Assessors,”	   Annals	   of	   Statistics	  17(4):1856-­‐1879.	  11	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  can	  never	  be	  in	  your	  best	  interest	  to	  have	  inaccurate	  doxastic	  states.	  	  Sometimes,	  for	   example,	   having	   a	   belief	  with	   a	   certain	   content	  will	   promote	   your	   aims,	   regardless	   of	   its	   accuracy.	   The	  guidance	  value	  of	  a	  credence	  function	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  value	  of	  that	  credence	  function	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  other	  pursuits,	  insofar	  as	  your	  success	  depends	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  your	  doxastic	  states,	  and	  not	  their	  content.	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   I	   find	   a	   principle	   like	   RatPref	   attractive,	   and	   closely	   connected	   to	   whatever	  constitutive	  connection	  exists	  between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy.	  	  But	  what	  I’m	  interested	  in	  here	  is	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  about	  rationality,	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  accuracy,	  that	  could	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  always	  expect	  the	  rational	  credences,	  whatever	  they	  are,	  to	  do	  better	  than	  some	   irrational	   credence	   function	   specified	   as	   such.	   	   After	   all,	   with	   any	   other	   generally	  reliable	  but	  sometimes	  fallible	  indicator	  of	  truth,	  it	  can	  sometimes	  be	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	   the	   indicator	   is	   going	   astray.	   	   I	   might	   think,	   for	   example,	   that	   my	   thermometer	   is	  generally	   reliable,	   but	   that,	   in	   this	   particular	   case,	   whatever	   it	   says	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   less	  accurate	   than	   some	   other	   temperature,	   which	   I	   know	   differs	   from	   its	   reading.	   (For	  example,	  maybe	  I	  know	  that	  the	  thermometer	  does	  not	  operate	  well	  at	  certain	  altitudes).	  	  So	  why	   is	   it	   that,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   rationality,	   a	   generally	   good	  but	   fallible	   guide	   to	   the	  truth,	  I	  can	  never	  assign	  less	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  the	  rational	  attitude	  (whatever	  it	  is)	  than	  to	   some	   particular	   attitude	   that	   I	   know	   is	   irrational?	   The	   thought	   that	   we	   must	   always	  expect	   the	   rational	   credence	   given	   our	   evidence	   to	   be	   best	   is	   indicative	   of	   an	   especially	  strong	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  take	  rationality	  to	  be	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  truth.	  	  	   Let’s	  now	  move	  on	  to	  the	  question	  of	  why	  one	  should	  be	  especially	  interested	  in	  the	  credences	   that	   are	   rationalized	   by	   one’s	   total	   evidence.	   	   What	   would	   be	   wrong	   with	  preferring	  a	  credence	  that	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  one’s	  evidence	  supports?	  Consider:	  	  GAME	  SHOW	  2	   	  On	  an	  advanced	  round	  of	  the	  game	  show	  Bill	  is	  offered	  a	  slightly	  different	  deal.	  	  As	  before,	  he	  can	  choose	  a	  pill	  that	  will	  give	  him	  the	  rational	  credence	  in	  RAIN,	  given	  his	  total	   evidence	   E.	   Alternatively,	   he	   can	   choose	   a	   particular	   subset	   of	   his	   evidence,	  which	  he	  knows	  supports	  a	  credence	  that	  differs	   from	  the	  credence	  that’s	  rational	  given	  his	   total	   evidence.	   	   The	  host	  will	   then	  give	  him	  a	  pill	   that	  will	   cause	  him	   to	  adopt	  the	  rational	  credence	  given	  his	  chosen	  subset.	  	  	  	  It	  seems	  like	  Bill	  should	  choose	  the	  pill	  that	  will	  give	  him	  the	  credence	  rationalized	  by	  his	  
total	  evidence.	  This	  suggests:	  
	  
	   8	  
TotPref	  (preference):	  For	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  E,	  and	  any	  E-­‐	  that	  is	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  propositions	   that	   is	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  E,	   if	  E	   is	  your	   total	  evidence,	  you	  should	  prefer	  R(E)	  to	  R(E-­‐),	  when	  you	  know	  that	  R(E)	  differs	  from	  R(E-­‐).12	  	  Once	   again,	   the	   relevant	   sense	   of	   “prefer”	   is	   the	   sense	   that	   is	   relevant	   to	   making	   good	  choices	  in	  pursuit	  of	  other	  values.	  	  So	  we	  can	  also	  think	  of	  the	  principle	  as	  follows:	  
	  
TotPref	  (expected	  accuracy):	  For	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  E,	  and	  for	  any	  r	  such	  that	  R(E)	  =	  r:	   EAA,r(R(E))	  >	  EAA,r(R(E-­‐))	  where	  E-­‐	  is	  any	  particular	  proper	  subset	  of	  E	  and	  r((R(E)	  =	  R(E-­‐))	  =	  0	  	   To	  see	  how	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref	  can	  come	  apart,	  imagine	  that	  an	  agent	  doesn’t	  know	  what	   credence	   function	   a	   body	   of	   evidence	   E-­‐,	   which	   is	   a	   proper	   subset	   of	   her	   total	  evidence	  E,	   supports.	   	  RatPref	  will	   tell	   the	  agent	   to	  prefer	  R(E)	   to	   any	   credence	   function	  
specified	  as	  such	  that	  the	  agent	  knows	  is	  irrational.	  	  However,	  RatPref	  doesn’t	  say	  anything	  about	   whether	   the	   agent	   should	   prefer	   R(E)	   to	   credences	   that	   the	   agent	   knows	   are	  irrational,	   but	   that	   are	   being	   considered	   under	   some	   description.	   	   For	   example,	   RatPref	  doesn’t	   forbid	   the	   agent	   from	  preferring	   the	   credence	   function	   satisfying	   the	  description	  “OMN:	   the	   credence	   function	   that	   assigns	  1	   to	  all	   truths	  and	  0	   to	  all	   falsehoods”	   to	  R(E),	  even	   though	   the	   agent	   knows	   that	   OMN	   is	   irrational.	   For	   the	   same	   reasons,	   if	   the	   agent	  doesn’t	   know	  which	   credence	   function	   satisfies	  R(E-­‐),	   then,	   even	   if	   the	  agent	  knows	   that	  R(E-­‐)	  is	  irrational,	  RatPref	  alone	  doesn’t	  tell	  the	  agent	  to	  prefer	  R(E)	  to	  R(E-­‐).	  	  RatPref	   and	  TotPref	  make	   explicit	   the	  way	   in	  which	   agents	   should	  prefer	   rational	  credences	  to	  irrational	  ones,	  and	  credences	  supported	  by	  their	  total	  evidence	  to	  credences	  supported	   by	   a	   proper	   subset.	   	   Before	   proceeding,	   I	   want	   to	   be	   clear	   about	   what	   these	  principles	   are	  not	  saying.	   	   First,	   RatPref	   and	  TotPref	   are	  not	  meant	   to	   be	   addressing	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Note	  that,	  since	  E-­‐	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  proper	  subset	  (or	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  evidence	  specified	  as	  such),	  E-­‐	  can’t	  be,	  for	  example,	  “the	  proper	  subset	  of	  my	  evidence	  that	  excludes	  all	  misleading	  evidence.”	  	  	  Also,	  recall,	  once	  again,	  that	  we	  are	  assuming	  that	  agents	  know	  what	  their	  evidence	  is.	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question:	   “Why	  be	   rational?”	   or	   “Why	   care	   about	   rationality?”13	  	   RatPref	   and	  TotPref	   are	  principles	  about	  what	  you	   should	  prefer,	   and	   the	   “should”	  here	   is	   a	   rational	   should.	   	  The	  question	  is:	  why	  is	  it	  rational	  to	  prefer,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  doing	  well	  on	  the	  game	  show,	  or	  being	  accurate	  relative	  to	  a	  strictly	  proper	  value	  function,	  the	  credence	  that	  is	  rational?	  	  If	  you’re	   skeptical	   about	   the	   value	   of	   rationality,	   the	   claim	   that	   it’s	   rational	   to	   prefer	   the	  rational	   credences	   may	   not	   have	   much	   force.	   	   But	   the	   preference	   questions	   are	   by	   no	  means	   trivial	   either.	   	   I	   am	   not	   asking	  why	   it’s	   rational	   to	   be	   rational.	   The	   fact	   that	   one	  should	  have	  the	  credences	  that	  are	  rational	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  one	  should	  prefer	  to	  have	  the	  credences	   that	   are	   rational.	   	   	   For	   example,	   it’s	   rational	   for	   Bill	   to	   prefer	   to	   have	   the	  credence	  function	  that	  assigns	  1	  to	  the	  truth	  about	  RAIN	  even	  though	  it’s	  not	  rational	  for	  Bill	  to	   have	   a	   credence	   function	   that	   assigns	   1	   to	   the	   truth	   about	   RAIN.	   	   So	   the	   question	   of	  whether	  one	  should	  prefer,	  for	  accuracy	  purposes,	  to	  have	  the	  credences	  that	  one,	  in	  fact,	  should	  have	  is	  a	  substantive	  question.	  	  	  
2.	  Best	  Plan	  to	  Follow	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  describe	  one	  picture	  of	  how	  rationality	  and	  accuracy	  are	  connected	  that	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   answer	   the	   three	   questions	   I	   posed.	   This	   picture,	   we	   shall	   see,	   is	  implicit	  in	  much	  of	  the	  “accuracy-­‐first”	  epistemology	  literature.	  	  To	  begin,	  I	  need	  to	  do	  a	  bit	  of	  setup.	  Call	  a	  function	  from	  potential	  bodies	  of	  evidence	  to	  doxastic	  states,	  an	  “epistemic	  plan.”	  	  (This	  sort	  of	  function	  is	  what	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace14	  call	   an	   “available	   act”).	   Now	   imagine	   that	   a	   perfectly	   rational	   agent	   with	   no	   empirical	  information	   (I’ll	   call	   her	   “Pria”	   for	   (perfectly	   rational	   ignorant	   agent))	   is	   contemplating	  what	   plan	   she	   would	   “program”	   into	   a	   robot	   if	   her	   goal	   was	   to	   maximize	   the	   expected	  accuracy	   of	   the	   credences	   the	   robot	  will	   have	   upon	   entering	   the	  world.	  	   By	   “program”	   I	  mean	  that	  Pria	  is	  choosing	  a	  function	  that	  will	  fully	  determine	  the	  credences	  the	  robot	  will	  have,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  evidence	  that	  it	  receives.	  	  	  More	  precisely,	  suppose	  that	  Pria	  is	  considering	  a	  partition	  of	  states	  s	  in	  which	  the	  robot	  receives	  some	  body	  of	  evidence	  (we’ll	  call	  this	  set	  of	  states	  “S”).	  	  The	  partition	  must	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  These	   questions	   are	   discussed	   by	   Kolodny,	   N.	   (2005)	   “Why	   be	   Rational?”	  Mind	   114(455):509-­‐563	   and	  Broome,	  J.	  (2007)	  “Wide	  or	  Narrow	  Scope.”	  Mind	  116(462):359-­‐370.	  
14	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace,	  op.	  cit.	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be	   sufficiently	   fine	   grained	   so	   as	   to	   fix,	   for	   any	   s	  ∈	   S,	   (a)	   the	   evidence	   that	   the	   robot	  receives	  in	  s	  and	  (b)	  the	  accuracy	  score	  of	  any	  credence	  function	  that	  the	  robot	  might	  adopt	  in	  s.	  	  Let	  P(s)	  be	  the	  credence	  function	  that	  a	  plan	  P	  recommends	  given	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	   robot	   receives	   in	   state	   s.	   If	  Pria’s	  probability	   function	   is	  Pr,	  then	  Pria	   is	   looking	   for	  a	  plan	  that	  maximizes	  the	  following	  quantity,	  which	  we’ll	  call	  the	  “expected	  accuracy	  of	  P”:	  	   EAA,Pr	  (P)	  =	  	  ∑	  Pr(s)*	  A(P(s),	  s)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  s∈S	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   a	   plan	   is	   the	  weighted	   average	   of	   the	   accuracy	  scores	  one	  would	  get	  from	  adopting	  the	  credences	  recommended	  by	  the	  plan.	  Call	  the	  plan	  that	  maximizes	   the	   quantity	   above	   the	  accuracy-­‐optimizing	  epistemic	  plan	  or	  A	   for	   short.	  	  We	  can	  also	  talk	  about	  the	  function	  from	  evidence	  to	  belief	  states	  that	  assigns	  to	  each	  body	  of	  evidence	  the	  doxastic	  state	  that	  is	  rational	  given	  that	  evidence.	  	  Let's	  call	  that	  the	  rational	  
epistemic	  plan	  or	  R	  for	  short.	  	   	  One	  way	  of	  answering	  the	  constitutive	  question,	  then,	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  R =	  A.	  In	  more	  detail:	  	  
Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow:	   	  The	  rational	  epistemic	  plan	   is	   the	  one	   that	  a	   rational	  agent	  would	  choose,	  a	  priori,	  if	  she	  were	  aiming	  to	  maximize	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  credences	  that	  an	  agent	  following	  the	  plan	  would	  adopt.15	  	  The	   rational	   credences	   given	   a	   body	   of	   evidence	   are	   those	   that	   the	   rational	  epistemic	  plan	  recommends	  given	  that	  body	  of	  evidence.	  	  Let	  me	  make	  three	  quick	  notes	  about	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	  before	  discussing	  it’s	  plausibility:	  	  First,	  note	  that	  this	  way	  of	  answering	  the	  constitutive	  question	  does	  not	  give	  us	  a	  reductive	  account	  of	  rationality,	  since	  it	  says	  that	  the	  rational	  epistemic	  plan	  is	  the	  one	  that	  a	  rational	  agent	  would	  regard,	  a	  priori,	  as	  accuracy	  optimizing.	  	  Second,	  note	  that	  “assign	  1	  to	  all	  and	  only	   the	   truths”	   is	  not	  the	  accuracy-­‐optimizing	  plan,	  since	  an	  epistemic	  plan	   is	  a	   function	  from	   bodies	   of	   evidence	   to	   credence	   functions,	   and	   Pria	   won’t	   know	   a	   priori	   which	  epistemic	  plans	  will	  result	  in	  the	  robot	  assigning	  1	  to	  all	  and	  only	  the	  truths	  in	  the	  actual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  By	  “follow”	  I	  don’t	  mean	  anything	  stronger	  than	  “conform	  to.”	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world.	   	  Finally,	  note	   that	   there	   is	  a	   sense	   in	  which	   this	  picture	  of	  epistemic	   rationality	   is	  essentially	  diachronic.	   	   It	  says,	   in	  effect,	   that	  what	   it	   is	  rational	  to	  believe	  given	  a	  body	  of	  evidence	  is	  what	  you’d	  want	  yourself	  to	  believe	  (if	  you	  were	  rational)	  prior	  to	  getting	  the	  evidence.	  	  	  	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   is	   prima	   facie	   plausible.	   For	   if	   it	  were	   false,	   and	   if	   Pria	   knew	  this,	   she	   could	   think	   to	  herself	   as	   follows:	   “Here	   are	   two	  plans,	   the	   rational	   one,	   and	   the	  accuracy-­‐optimizing	  one.	  They	  are	  different.	   	  So	  I	  hope	  I	  don’t	  go	  into	  the	  world	  and	  form	  credences	  rationally!	   	   If	  I	  want	  to	  be	  accurate,	  I’d	  rather	  adopt	  these	  particular	  credences	  (which	  I	  know	  are	  irrational)	  in	  response	  to	  E,	  than	  adopt	  these	  other	  particular	  credences	  (which	  I	  know	  are	  rational)	  in	  response	  to	  E!”	  	  It	  would	  certainly	  be	  surprising	  if	  this	  were	  a	  rational	  stance	  to	  take	  a	  priori.	  	  	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   is	   also	   in	   the	   background	   of	  much	   of	   the	  work	   being	   done	   in	  “accuracy-­‐first”	  epistemology.	  	  For	  example,	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace16	  argue	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  “conditionalization	   maximizes	   expected	   accuracy.”	   	   They	   show	   that	   prior	   to	   getting	  
evidence,	   one	   should	  want	   to	   revise	  one’s	   credences	  by	  updating	  by	   conditionalization.	  If	  one	  wants	  to	  use	  the	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace	  result	  to	  motivate	  the	  claim	  that,	  upon	  gaining	  
evidence,	   it’s	  rational	  to	  have	  the	  credences	  that	  result	  from	  conditionalizing	  on	  a	  rational	  credence	   function,	   one	   needs	   some	   principle	   about	   how	   facts	   concerning	   the	   expected	  accuracy	  of	  plans	  prior	  to	   receiving	  evidence	  bear	  on	   the	   rationality	  of	  belief	   states	  upon	  
receiving	  evidence.	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   is	   exactly	   the	   principle	   that	   fills	   this	   gap.	   	   It	  says	  that	  the	  rational	  credences	  given	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  the	  initial	  rational	  credence	  function	  (that	  is,	  Pria’s	  function)	  regards	  as	  accuracy	  optimizing.	  We	  know	  from	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace	  that	  Pria	  will	  regard	  conditionalizing	  on	  the	  evidence	  as	  maximizing	  expected	   accuracy.	   Thus,	   it	   follows	   from	   the	  Greaves	   and	  Wallace	   result,	   in	   combination	  with	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow,	  that	  the	  rational	  credences	  given	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  are	  those	  that	   result	   from	   conditionalizing	   the	   rational	   prior	   probability	   function	   on	   the	   evidence	  received.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace,	  op.	  cit.	  	  Subsequent	  references	  to	  this	  work	  are	  given	  in	  the	  text.	  17	  That’s	   actually	   not	   quite	   right.	   I	   show	   in	   Schoenfield,	  M.	   (ms.)	   “Conditionalization	   does	   not	   (in	   general)	  maximize	  expected	  accuracy”	  that	  the	  Greaves	  and	  Wallace	  result	  only	  obtains	  if,	  for	  any	  proposition	  E	  that	  an	  agent	   thinks	   might	   constitute	   her	   (or	   her	   robot’s)	   total	   evidence	   in	   the	   future,	   the	   agent	   is	   antecedently	  certain	  that	  E	  will	  be	  true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  E	  is	  her	  total	  evidence.	  The	  update	  procedure	  that	  maximizes	  expected	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Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   a	   number	   of	   other	   accuracy-­‐based	  arguments	   for	  principles	  of	   rationality,	   since	  such	  arguments	   frequently	   take	   the	   form	  of	  showing	   that	   the	   initial	   rational	   credence	   function	   has	   certain	   features.	   	   For	   example,	   in	  defending	   the	   Principal	   Principle,	   Richard	   Pettigrew	   writes:	   “I	   will	   talk	   throughout	   of	  norms	  that	  govern	  an	  agent’s	   initial	  or	  ur-­‐credence	   function:	   that	   is,	   the	  agent’s	  credence	  function	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  or	  her	  epistemic	  life,	  prior	  to	  accumulating	  any	  evidence.”	  18	  But	   suppose	  we	  want	   to	  make	  a	   judgment	  about	   the	   rational	   response	   for	   someone	  with	  some	  evidence	  –	  say	  someone	  whose	  only	  evidence	  is	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  chance	  of	  p	  is	  x.	  	  Pettigrew’s	  argument	  will	  only	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  assign	  credence	  x	  to	  p	  if	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	  is	  assumed.	  So,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  account	  have	  some	  prima	  facie	  plausibility,	   it	   underlies	   much	   of	   the	   project	   involving	   the	   derivation	   of	   rational	  requirements	  from	  accuracy-­‐based	  considerations.	  
	  	   Let’s	  move	  on	  to	  the	  Preference	  Questions.	  	  I	  will	  now	  show	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  give	  an	  argument	  for	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref	  so	  long	  as	  we	  assume	  that	  Pria	  is	  certain	  that	  her	  plan	  (A)	  is	  the	  rational	  plan.	  	  	  Here’s	  the	  argument:	  Assume	  Pria	  is	  certain	  that	  her	  plan	  is	  the	  rational	  plan.	  If	  she	  is	   aiming	   to	  maximize	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   her	   robot,	   she	  will	   impart	   this	   certainty	  onto	  it.	   	  After	  all,	  she	  will	  think:	  “If	  the	  robot	  assigns	  credence	  1	  to	  any	  proposition	  of	  the	  form:	  “the	  rational	  credence	  function	  given	  evidence	  E	  is	  r”	  that	  I	  am	  certain	  of,	  the	  robot	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  have	  credence	  1	  in	  a	  truth!”	  So	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  Pria	  is	  certain	  of	  which	  plan	  is	  rational	  entails	  that:	  
	  
Rational	  Omniscience:	  For	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  E,	  every	  rational	  agent	  will	  always	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  proposition	  “the	  rational	  credence	  function	  given	  E	  is	  r”	  where	  r	  is	  rational	  given	  E.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  accuracy	   is	   general	   (even	  when	   this	   condition	   is	   not	   satisfied)	   is	   what	   I	   have	   called	   “conditionalization*.”	  However,	  the	  differences	  between	  conditionalization	  and	  conditionalization*	  don’t	  matter	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper.	  18	  Pettigrew,	  R.	  (2012).	  “Accuracy,	  Chance	  and	  the	  Principal	  Principle.”	  Philosophical	  Review	  121(2):241-­‐275,	  p.243.	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I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  evaluate	  the	  plausibility	  of	  Rational	  Omniscience	  at	  this	  point.19	  	  My	  aim,	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section,	  is	  just	  to	  show	  that	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  Rational	  Omniscience.	   In	   the	  next	   section,	   I’ll	   discuss	   an	   alternative	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	   the	   connection	   between	   rationality	   and	   accuracy	   that	   doesn’t	   involve	   this	  commitment.	   	   	   But,	   as	   we’ll	   see,	   according	   to	   the	   sorts	   of	   views	   that	   motivate	   rejecting	  
Rational	  Omniscience,	   TotPref	   is	   false,	   and	   RatPref	   is	   questionable.	   	   So,	   for	   better	   or	   for	  worse,	  our	  sympathies	  for	  principles	  like	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref	  are	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  rational	  agents	  are	  certain	  of	  what	  is	  rational.	  Suppose	  that	  Rational	  Omniscience	  is	   true	  and	  so	   I,	  a	  rational	  agent,	  know	  that	  my	  evidence,	  E,	  supports	  r.	  What	  could	  be	  wrong	  with	  thinking	  that,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  expected	   accuracy	   of	   the	   credence	   function	   supported	   by	   my	   evidence	   is	   less	   than	   the	  expected	   accuracy	   of	   some	   other	   credence	   function,	   i?	   	   Here’s	   the	   argument	   (which	   is	  inspired	   by	   an	   argument	   from	   Sophie	  Horowitz20):	   Suppose	   for	   reductio	   that	   it	   could	   be	  rational	   for	  me	   to	   think:	   “My	  evidence	  supports	  r,	  but	   i	  is	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	   than	  the	   credence	   function	   that	   my	   evidence	   supports.”	   	   Then,	   since	   I	   am	   certain	   that	   the	  evidence	   supports	   r,	   I	   must	   think	   that	   i	   is	   more	   expectedly	   accurate	   than	   r.	   	   But	   if	   it’s	  rational	  to	  assign	  greater	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  i	  than	  to	  r,	  then	  it	  can’t	  be	  rational	  to	  adopt	  
r!	  	  This	  is	  intuitive,	  and	  this	  intuition	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we’re	  using	  strictly	  proper	  scoring	  rules,	  which	  means	   that	  r	  must	  assign	  greater	  expected	  accuracy	   to	   itself	   than	   to	  any	   other	   credence	   function	   specified	   as	   such.	   	   Thus,	   if	   it’s	   rational	   to	   have	   a	   credence	  function	  that	  assigns	  greater	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  i	  than	  to	  r,	  the	  rational	  credence	  function	  can’t	  itself	  be	  r,	  contrary	  to	  our	  stipulation.	  A	   similar	   line	  of	   reasoning	   supports	  TotPref.	   Suppose	   that	  Rational	  Omniscience	   is	  true	   and	   so	   I,	   a	   rational	   agent,	   know	   that	   my	   evidence,	   E,	   supports	   r,	   and	   that	   some	  particular	  subset	  of	  my	  evidence,	  E-­‐,	  supports	  i.	  What	  could	  be	  wrong	  with	  thinking	  that,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  credence	  function	  supported	  by	  my	  total	  evidence	  E	   is	   less	   than	   the	   expected	   accuracy	  of	   the	   credence	   function	   that	  E-­‐	   supports?	  	  Here’s	   the	  argument:	  Suppose	   for	   reductio	   that	   it	   could	  be	  rational	   for	  me	   to	   think:	   “The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Though	   see	  Titelbaum,	  M.	   (forthcoming)	   “Rationality’s	   Fixed	  Point”	  Oxford	  Studies	   in	  Epistemology	  Vol.	  5.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  for	  a	  defense.	  
20	  Horowitz	  op.	  cit.	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credence	  function	  that	  the	  subset	  of	  my	  evidence,	  E-­‐,	  supports	  is	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	  than	   the	   credence	   function	   that	  my	   total	   evidence	   supports.”	   	   Then,	   since	   I	   know	   that	   E	  supports	  r,	  and	  E-­‐	  supports	  i,	  I	  must	  think	  that	  i	  is	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	  than	  r.	  	  But,	  for	  the	   reasons	   given	   above,	   if	   it’s	   rational	   to	   have	   a	   credence	   function	   that	   assigns	   greater	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  i	  than	  to	  r,	  the	  rational	  credence	  function	  can’t	  itself	  be	  r,	  contrary	  to	  our	  stipulation.	  You	  might	  have	  the	  following	  worry	  about	  these	  arguments	  for	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref:	  when	  we	   judged	   that	  Bill	   should	  choose	   the	   rationality	  pill,	   or	   the	   total	   evidence	  pill,	  we	  thought:	   even	   if	   Bill	   doesn’t	   know	   which	   credences	   are	   rational,	   he	   should	   prefer	   the	  rationality	  pill.	   	   And	  even	   if	  Bill	  doesn’t	  know	  which	   credences	   some	  proper	   subset	   of	   his	  evidence	  rationalizes,	  he	  should	  prefer	  the	  credence	  that’s	  rational	  given	  his	  total	  evidence.	  	  Can	  we	  give	  an	  explanation	  for	  these	  judgments?	  	  I	  think	  so.	  If	   Rational-­‐Omniscience	   is	   true,	   then	   if	   we	   ask	   what	   Bill	   should	   do	  when	   he’s	   not	  
certain	  what	  credences	  are	  rational,	  we’re	   asking	   how	   someone	  who	   is	   already	   irrational	  should	  proceed.	  	  This	  can	  be	  a	  problematic	  question	  at	  times,	  but	  if	  Rational-­‐Omniscience	  is	  true,	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   a	   very	   idealized	   notion	   of	   rationality.	   	   And	   if	   rationality	   is	   so	  idealized,	  it	  had	  better	  turn	  out	  that	  we	  can	  make	  some	  true	  judgments	  about	  what	  agents	  who	  aren’t	  rationally	  omniscient	  should	  do	  and	  believe.	  So	  it	  seems,	  at	  very	  least,	  that	  when	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  agent	  knows	  what	  choice	  is	  rationally	  required,	  we	  can	  correctly	  judge	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  her	  to	  make	  that	  choice.21	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  weak	  constraint	  on	  the	  correctness	  of	  rationality	  judgments	  about	  non-­‐ideal	  agents.	  What	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  Bill?	  Even	  if	  Bill	   isn’t	  certain	  what	  credences	  are	  rational,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  knows	  that	  a	  perfectly	  rational	  agent	  would	  choose	  the	  rationality	  pill	  over	  an	  irrationality	   pill,	   it	   follows	   from	   the	   weak	   constraint	   above	   that	   Bill	   should	   choose	   the	  rationality	  pill	  as	  well.	  	  But	  can	  Bill	  know	  that	  this	  is	  what	  an	  ideally	  rational	  agent	  would	  choose?	  	  Yes.	  	  For	  as	  long	  as	  Bill	  knows	  that	  Rational-­‐Omniscience	  is	  true,	  he	  can	  go	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  One	  might	   want	   to	   weaken	   this	   principle	   even	   further	   so	   that	   it	   says	   that	   if	   an	   agent	   knows	   that	   ideal	  rationality	  requires	  making	  a	  certain	  choice,	  and	  that	  a	  rational	  version	  of	  herself	  would	  recommend	  that	  she	  make	  that	  choice,	  then	  that	  is	  the	  choice	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  her	  to	  make.	  	  This	  modification	  won’t	  make	  any	  difference	  for	  what	  follows.	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the	   reasoning	   above	   to	   convince	   himself	   that	   an	   ideally	   rational	   agent	  would	   choose	   the	  rationality	  pill	  (and	  the	  total	  evidence	  pill).	  	  	  	  Still,	  you	  might	  worry	  that	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  game	  show	  cases	  weren’t	  based	  on	  Bill’s	  acceptance	  of	  any	  controversial	  principles	   like	  Rational	  Omniscience,22	  and	  so	  we	  shouldn’t	   be	   relying	   on	   Rational	   Omniscience	   in	   explaining	   these	   judgments.	   In	   fact,	  however,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  our	  judgments	  about	  such	  cases	  should	  depend	  on	  what	  we	  think	  about	   Rational	   Omniscience.	   As	   we’ll	   see,	   commonly	   accepted	   views	   that	   reject	   Rational	  
Omniscience	   have	   the	   consequence	   that	   Bill	   shouldn’t	   always	   choose	   these	   pills.	   	   Our	  inclination	  to	   judge	  that	   it	   is	  rational	   to	  prefer,	   for	  accuracy	  purposes,	   the	  credences	  that	  our	  total	  evidence	  rationalizes	  is,	   in	  fact,	  based	  on	  an	  implicit	  commitment	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  a	  rational	  agent	   is	  always	  certain	  about	  what	   is	  rational.23	  	  This	  will	  be	  argued	  for	   in	  section	  3.	  	   Let’s	  take	  stock.	  	  I	  started	  out	  asking	  three	  questions:	  Why	  should	  we	  prefer	  rational	  credences	   to	   irrational	   ones?	   	  Why	   should	  we	  prefer	   credences	   rationalized	  by	   our	   total	  evidence	   to	   credences	   rationalized	   by	   a	   proper	   subset	   of	   the	   evidence?	   	   What	   is	   the	  constitutive	  connection	  between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy?	  The	  picture	   I	  described	   in	   this	  section	   was	   based	   on	   taking,	   as	   our	   answer	   to	   the	   constitutive	   question,	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow:	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   rational	   credences	   are	   those	   that	   accord	  with	   the	   plan	   that	   a	  rational	   agent	  would,	   a	   priori,	   regard	   as	   accuracy	   optimizing.	   	   I	   then	   showed	   that	   if	   we	  assume	  that	  Pria	  (the	  perfectly	  rational	  ignorant	  agent)	  is	  certain	  about	  which	  plan	  is	  the	  rational	   plan,	   there	   is	   an	   argument	   to	   be	  made	   from	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   to	   RatPref	   and	  TotPref.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Thanks	  to	  Christopher	  Peacocke	  for	  raising	  this	  worry.	  
23	  I	   know	   of	   no	   arguments	   for	   principles	   like	   RatPref	   and	   TotPref	   that	   don’t	   ultimately	   rely	   on	   Rational-­‐
Omniscience.	   The	   only	   argument	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   I	   am	   familiar	  with	   for	   a	   principle	   like	  RatPref	   is	   the	  argument	  in	  Horowitz’s,	  op.	  cit.’s	  discussion	  of	  “the	  value	  question.”	  	  But	  her	  argument	  only	  works	  if	  Rational	  
Omniscience	   is	   assumed.	   The	   only	   argument	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   I	   am	   familiar	   with	   for	   a	   principle	   like	  TotPref	   is	   an	   argument	   in	   Good,	   I.J.	   (1967)	   “On	   the	   Principle	   of	   Total	   Evidence.”	   British	   Journal	   for	   the	  
Philosophy	   of	   Science	   17(3):	   319-­‐321.	   However,	   Good’s	   argument	   only	   successfully	   establishes	   that	   you	  should	   assign	   greater	   expected	   accuracy	   to	   the	   credences	   based	   on	   your	   total	   evidence,	   than	   to	   credences	  based	  on	  a	  subset	  of	  that	  evidence,	  before	  getting	  the	  evidence.	   	   It	  doesn’t	  justify	  the	  claim	  that,	  once	  you	  get	  
the	   evidence,	   you	   should	   assign	   greater	   expected	   accuracy	   to	   the	   credence	   that’s	   rational	   given	   the	   total	  evidence	   than	   to	   the	   credence	   that’s	   rational	   given	   a	   proper	   subset	   of	   this	   evidence.	   For	   this,	   you	   need	  
Rational-­‐Omniscience.	  Good	  does	  suggest	  a	   reply	   to	  a	   similar	  worry,	  but	   it	   is	  unsatisfactory.	  Diagnosing	   the	  flaw	  in	  Good’s	  response	  would	  take	  us	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  but	  it’s	  also	  not	  necessary.	   	  For	  we’ll	  see	  later	  that,	  without	  Rational-­‐Omniscience,	  we	  can	  get	  straightforward	  counterexamples	  to	  TotPref.	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3.	  Why	  One	  Might	  be	  Unhappy	  with	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow:	  Higher	  Order	  Evidence	  The	  aim	  of	   this	  section	   is	   to	  show	  why	  one	  might	  want	   to	  reject	   the	  picture	   that	   I	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  To	  begin,	  consider:	  	  	  HYPOXIA24	  While	   flying	   an	   airplane,	   you	   perform	   some	   calculations	   to	   determine	  whether	   or	  not	  you	  have	  enough	   fuel	   to	  make	   it	   to	  Hawaii.	   	  You	  suddenly	  get	  a	  message	   from	  ground	   control:	   “Dear	   pilot,	   you	   are	   flying	   at	   an	   altitude	   which	   makes	   you	  susceptible	  to	  hypoxia,	  a	  condition	  that	  impairs	  your	  ability	  to	  reason	  properly.	  	  The	  judgments25	  people	   at	   your	   altitude	   make	   concerning	   how	   far	   they	   can	   fly	   are	  correct	  only	  50%	  of	  the	  time.”	  	  	  How	  confident	  should	  you	  be	  that	  you	  have	  enough	  fuel	   to	  make	   it	   to	  Hawaii?	   	  Plausibly,	  you	  should	  be	  only	  50%	  confident.	   I	  will	  call	   the	  view	  that	  motivates	  this	  sort	  of	   thought	  “calibrationism.”	   	   More	   precisely,	   let	   the	   antecedent	   probability	   that	   you	   assign	   to	   your	  judgment	   being	   correct	   in	   the	   circumstances	   in	   question	   your	   “expected	   degree	   of	  reliability.”	  	  
Calibrationism:	  If	  your	  expected	  degree	  of	  reliability	  concerning	  whether	  p	  is	  0.5,	  and	  you	  judge	  that	  p,	  you	  should	  be	  0.5	  confident	  in	  p.	  Two	  notes:	  First,	  calibrationism	  is	  by	  no	  means	  uncontroversial,	  and	  my	  purpose	  here	  isn’t	  to	  defend	  the	  view.	  	  All	  I	  am	  claiming	  is	  that	  the	  view	  has	  some	  intuitive	  plausibility.	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  defended	  by	  many	  people	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  higher	  order	  evidence.26	  Since,	  as	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  This	  case	  is	  a	  variant	  of	  a	  case	  from	  Elga,	  A.	  (ms.)	  “Lucky	  to	  Be	  Rational.”	  25	  The	  agent’s	  judgment	  is	  just	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  (or	  would	  be)	  most	  confident	  in	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  alone.	  	  	  26	  Defenders	   include	   Roush,	   S.	   (2009)	   “Second	   Guessing:	   A	   Self-­‐Help	   Manual.”	   Episteme	   6(3):	   251-­‐68;	  Feldman,	   R.	   (2009)	   “Evidentialism,	   Higher	   Order	   Evidence	   and	   Disagreement”	   Episteme	   6(3):294-­‐312;	  Christensen,	  D.	   (2010)	   “Higher	  Order	  Evidence”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	   81(1):185-­‐215;	  	  Horowitz,	  S.	  And	  Sliwa,	  P.	   (forthcoming)	   “Respecting	  All	   the	  Evidence”	  Philosophical	  Studies;	  Elga,	  A.	  op.	  cit.	  and	  Vavova,	  K.	   (ms.)	   “Irrelevant	   Influences.”	   	  Dissenters	   include	  Lasonen-­‐Aarnio,	  M.	   (2010)	   “Unreasonable	  Knowledge”	   Philosophical	   Perspectives	  24(1):1-­‐21;	   Kelly,	   T.	   (2011).	   “Peer	   Disagreement	   and	   Higher	   Order	  Evidence”	   in	   A.	   Goldman	   &	   D.	   Whitcomb	   (eds.)	   Social	   Epistemology:	   Essential	   Readings.	   Oxford	   University	  Press;	  Titelbaum,	  op.	  cit.	  andWeatherson,	  B.	  (ms.)	  “Do	  Judgments	  Screen	  Evidence?”.	  	  See	  also	  Schoenfield,	  M.	  (forthcoming)	   “A	   Dilemma	   for	   Calibrationism”	   Philosophy	   and	   Phenomenological	   Research	   and	   White,	   R.	  (2009)	  “On	  Treating	  Oneself	  and	  Others	  as	  a	  Thermometer.”	  Episteme	  6(3):233-­‐250.	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will	   argue,	   the	   view	   is	   inconsistent	  with	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow,	  we	  may	   eventually	   have	   to	  make	  a	  choice	  about	  whether	  to	  give	  up	  calibrationism	  or	  give	  up	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow.	  Both	  calibrationism	  and	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	  are	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  and	  have	  garnered	  much	  support	  in	  the	  literature	  so	  the	  decision	  about	  which	  to	  abandon	  should	  be	  made	  with	  care.	  Second,	  the	  version	  of	  calibrationism	  I	  presented	  above	  is	  simpler	  than	  some,	  and	  weaker	  than	   some,	   but	   the	   various	   bells	   and	   whistles	   that	   one	   might	   add	   need	   not	   concern	   us	  here.27	  	  I’ll	  be	  applying	  calibrationism	  only	  to	  the	  most	  uncontroversial	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  most	  plausible	  for	  such	  a	  principle	  to	  apply.	  So	   why	   is	   the	   picture	   sketched	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   unavailable	   to	   the	  calibrationist?	  	  	  Let’s	  begin	  with	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow.	  
Why	  the	  Calibrationist	  Must	  Reject	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	  To	  see	  why	  calibrationists	  have	   to	   reject	   the	  claim	   that	   the	   rational	   credences	  are	  the	   accuracy	   optimizing	   ones,	   recall	   that	   Pria	   is	   looking	   for	   an	   epistemic	   plan	   which	  optimizes	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  credences	  an	  agent	  following	  this	  plan	  would	  adopt.	  Now,	  put	  yourself	  in	  Pria’s	  shoes.	  	  Suppose	  you’re	  trying	  to	  decide,	  a	  priori,	  how	  to	  program	  your	  robot’s	  responses	  to	  some	  ordinary	  meteorological	  evidence	  E.	  	  You	  conclude	  that	  the	  accuracy	   optimizing	   response	  would	   involve	   the	   robot	   believing	   that	   it	  will	   rain	   if	   given	  evidence	   E.	   You	   now	   consider	   the	   evidence	   that	   consists	   of	   E	   and	   also	   higher	   order	  evidence	   about	   the	   robot’s	   cognitive	   functioning.	   	   If	   it’s	   up	   to	   you	   to	   determine	   what	  credence	   function	   the	   robot	   adopts	   in	   these	   circumstances,	   you	   should	   want	   it	   to	   still	  believe	  RAIN.	   	  For	  you	  shouldn’t	   think	   that	   it	   is	  any	   less	   likely	   to	  rain	   in	  circumstances	   in	  which	  the	  robot	  has	  E,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  evidence	  about	  its	  cognitive	  functioning,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  rain	   in	   the	  circumstances	   in	  which	   the	  robot	  has	  E.	  Since	   the	  calibrationist	   thinks	   that	  what	   is	  rational	   given	   these	   two	  bodies	  of	   evidence	  differs,	   the	   calibrationist	  must	   reject	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow.	  	  Here	  is	  another	  way	  of	  making	  the	  point:	  Recall	  that	  the	  accuracy-­‐optimizing	  plan	  is	  the	   plan,	   P,	   that	   maximizes	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   the	   credence	   functions	   that	   P	  
recommends	   given	   a	   body	   of	   evidence.	   So,	   as	   far	   as	   the	   accuracy-­‐optimizing	   plan	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  In	   particular,	   I	   am	   only	   assuming	   that	   one	   should	   calibrate	   concerning	  whether	   p	   when	   one’s	   expected	  degree	  of	  reliability	  is	  0.5,	  so	  as	  to	  remain	  neutral	  between	  the	  two	  versions	  of	  calibraitonism	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  Schoenfield	  ibid.	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concerned,	   whether	   an	   agent	   will	   likely	   succeed	   at	   adopting	   the	   credence	   function	   in	  question	   is	  completely	   irrelevant.	  Thus,	   if	  we’re	  considering,	  a	  priori,	   the	  plan	  that	   issues	  the	  most	  expectedly	  accurate	  recommendations,	  one	  that	  disregards	  higher	  order	  evidence	  will	  be	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	  than	  one	  that	  accounts	  for	  it.	  The	  calibrationist	  will	  thus	  think	  that	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	  gives	  an	  oversimplified	  answer	  to	  the	  constitutive	  question.	  It	   attends	   only	   to	   how	   good	   a	   plan	   is	   as	   a	   plan	   to	   follow,	   and	   so	   disregards	   important	  evidence	  the	  agent	  might	  receive	  concerning	  the	  likelihood	  that	  she	  will	  actually	  succeed	  at	  following	  such	  plans.28	  Since	  the	  calibrationist	  must	  reject	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow,	  we	  might	  wonder	  how	  the	  calibrationist	  should	  answer	  the	  constitutive	  question.	  We	  will	  get	  to	  this	  in	  section	  4.	  	  But	  first	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  calibrationist	  might	  respond	  to	  the	  preference	  questions:	  what	  can	  she	  say	  about	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref?	  	  	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  calibrationists	  will	  have	  to	  reject	  Rational	  Omniscience.	  	  After	  all,	  plausibly	  it	  is	  because	  in	  certain	  cases,	  agents	  should	  become	  unsure	  about	  what	  their	   initial	   body	   of	   evidence	   supports,	   that	   the	   higher	   order	   evidence	   should	   lead	   to	   a	  revision	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  So	  the	  arguments	  I	  gave	  for	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref	  are	  not	  available	  to	  the	  calibrationist.	  But	  can	  she	  accept	  them	  anyway?	  	  Let’s	  begin	  with	  TotPref.	  
Why	  The	  Calibrationist	  Must	  Reject	  TotPref	  The	  calibrationist	  will	  have	  to	  reject	  TotPref.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  calibrationist	  will	  think	  that	  sometimes	  we	  should	  prefer	  having	  credences	  supported	  by	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  our	  evidence	  to	  the	  credences	  supported	  by	  our	  total	  evidence.	   	  To	  see	  why,	  suppose	  you	  find	  yourself	   in	  a	  scenario	   like	  HYPOXIA.	   	  Let’s	   call	   the	  evidence	   that	  you	  get	   from	  ground	  control	  about	  your	  susceptibility	  to	  hypoxia	  your	  	  “higher	  order	  evidence”	  and	  the	  evidence	  you	  had	  before	  getting	  this	  evidence	  –	  the	  evidence	  you	  gained	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  plane’s	  dials,	  gauges	  and	  maps	  –	  your	  “first	  order	  evidence.”	  	  Suppose	  that,	  before	  you	  received	  the	  higher	  order	  evidence,	  you	  were	  confident	  that	  you	  had	  enough	  fuel,	  but	  upon	  hearing	  the	  message	  from	  ground	  control,	  you	  have	  reduced	  your	  confidence	  to	  0.5.	   	  Still,	  you	  should	  regard	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	   the	  credences	   that	  satisfy	   the	  description	  “the	  credences	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 	  I	   give	   a	   formal	   proof	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   calibrationism	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Follow	   in	  Schoenfield,	  M.	  (ms.)	  “An	  Accuracy	  Based	  Approach	  to	  Higher	  Order	  Evidence.”	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that	  are	  rational	  given	  my	  first	  order	  evidence”	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	   credences	   that	   satisfy	   the	  description	   “the	   credences	   that	   are	   rational	   given	  my	   total	  evidence.”	  (Note	  that	  I’m	  not	  claiming	  that	  you	  should	  think	  that	  the	  credences	  you	  would	  
have	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  alone	  are	  more	  expectedly	  accurate	  than	  the	  credences	  that	  are	  rational	  given	  your	  total	  evidence).	  If	   this	   doesn’t	   seem	   intuitive	   to	   you,	   think	   about	   what	   credences	   you’d	   prefer	   to	  have	  your	  actions	  guided	  by	  (and	  recall,	  that	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  “prefer”	  that	  is	  relevant	  in	  this	   paper).	   Let’s	   suppose	   for	   simplicity	   that	   your	   evidence	   either	   entails	   that	   you	   have	  enough	   fuel	  or	   that	  you	  don’t	   (but	  some	  complicated	  reasoning	   is	  required	   to	  derive	   this	  entailment).	  If	  your	  actions	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  credences	  that,	  according	  to	  calibrationism,	  your	  total	  evidence	  supports,	  you’ll	  have	  a	  0.5	  credence	  that	  you	  have	  enough	  fuel,	  and	  so	  you’re	  going	  to	  play	  it	  safe	  and	  go	  home.	  	  This	  would	  be	  a	  very	  sad	  way	  to	  commence	  your	  much-­‐anticipated	  vacation!	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   if	   you	   could	   choose	   to	  have	  your	   actions	  guided	  by	   the	   credences	   that	   are	   in	   fact	   rational	   given	  only	   the	   first	   order	   evidence,	   you	  would	  only	  return	  home	  if,	  in	  fact,	  you	  didn’t	  have	  enough	  fuel.	  (Recall	  that	  your	  evidence	  entails	   either	   that	   you	   have	   enough	   fuel	   or	   that	   you	   don’t).	   If	   you	   did	   have	   enough,	   you	  would	  keep	  flying	  to	  Hawaii	  and	  be	  sipping	  a	  cocktail	  on	  the	  beach	  within	  a	  few	  hours.	  	  The	  expected	   value	   of	   either	   having	   a	   shot	   at	   arriving	   safely	   in	  Hawaii	   or	   returning	   home	   is	  greater	  than	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  a	  certain	  return	  home.	  	  So,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  credences	  that	  you’d	   want	   your	   actions	   guided	   by,	   you	   should	   prefer	   the	   credences	   rationalized	   by	   a	  proper	   subset	   of	   your	   evidence	   to	   the	   credences	   rationalized	   by	   the	   total.	   This	   is	  inconsistent	  with	  TotPref.29	  
	  
Calibrationism	  and	  RatPref	  	   Whether	  or	  not	  the	  calibrationist	  will	  have	  to	  reject	  RatPref	  depends	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  calibrationist	  one	   is.	   	  On	  the	  view	  that	   I	  have	  called	   in	  other	  work30	  “E-­‐calibrationism,”	  rational	  agents	  should	  sometimes	  assign	  greater	  expected	  accuracy	  to	  a	  particular	  credence	  function	  g	  than	  to	  the	  credence	  function	  under	  the	  description	  “the	  rational	  credence	  given	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  See	  also	  Horowitz,	  S.	  (ms.)	  “Predictably	  Misleading	  Evidence”	  for	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  should	  expect	  higher	  order	  evidence	  to	  be	  predictably	  and	  systematically	  misleading.	  	  
30	  Schoenfield,	  M.	  (forthcoming).	  “A	  Dilemma	  for	  Calibrationism.”	  op.	  cit.	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my	  evidence.”	  But	  arguing	  for	  this	  in	  detail	  will	  take	  us	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.31	  	  All	  I	  will	  say	  about	  RatPref	  here	  is	  that	  calibrationism	  leaves	  the	  principle	  unmotivated.	  	  So	  far,	  we	  don’t	  have	  an	  account	  of	  what	  it	  is	  about	  rationality	  that	  could	  explain	  why,	  for	  accuracy	  purposes,	  we	  should	  prefer	  rational	  credences	  to	  credences	  that	  we	  know	  are	  irrational.	  	  
4.	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  	   The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  describe	  an	  alternative	  connection	  between	  rationality	  and	   accuracy	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   (and,	   as	   a	   bonus,	   motivates!)	   calibrationism.	   	   For	  reasons	  of	  space,	   I	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  do	   justice	  to	  the	  account’s	  benefits	  or	   its	  problems.	  	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  just	  to	  put	  the	  proposal	  on	  the	  table	  and	  suggest	  that	  something	  like	  it	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  calibrationism.	  	  	   This	  alternative	  account	  takes	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  “epistemic	  plan”	  quite	  literally.	  	  But	  this	  time,	  the	  planner	  is	  not	  asking	  what’s	  the	  best	  plan	  to	  follow?	  	  Rather,	  she	  is	  asking,	  what’s	  
the	  best	  plan	   to	  make?	   	   In	   cases	   in	  which	   one	   is	   taking	   seriously	   the	   possibility	   that	   one	  might	   fail	   to	   conform	   to	   a	   plan	   that	   one	  makes	   these	   two	   questions	   will	   yield	   different	  answers.	  	  	  Indeed,	  in	  ordinary	  life,	  when	  we	  compare	  plans,	  we	  are	  usually	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  expected	  results	  of	  making	  a	  plan	  than	  we	  are	  in	  the	  expected	  results	  of	  conforming	  to	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 	  Here’s	   a	   quick	   version	   of	   the	   argument:	   Suppose	   one	   adopts	   the	   position	   that	   I	   have	   called	   	   “E-­‐Calibrationism”	  in	  Schoenfield,	   ibid.	  On	  this	  view,	  one’s	  credence	  in	  p,	  when	  p	  is	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  first	  
order	  evidence	  best	  supports	  should	  equal	  one’s	  expected	  degree	  of	  reliability.	  	  (E-­‐calibrationism	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  one’s	  credences	  shouldn’t	  depend	  only	  on	  one’s	   judgment	  and	  one’s	  higher	  order	  evidence:	  one’s	   first	   order	   evidence	   should	   play	   a	   role	   as	   well.	   	   See	   Schoenfield	   ibid.,	  Horowitz	   and	   Sliwa	   op.	   cit,	  Weatherson	   op.	   cit.	   and	   White	   op.	   cit.	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   why	   this	   is	   an	   important	   desideratum	   for	   a	  calibrationist	  theory).	  In	  that	  paper,	  I	  describe	  the	  following	  type	  of	  case:	  I	  judge	  that	  tomorrow	  will	  be	  sunny	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  meteorological	  evidence	  (this	  is	  my	  first	  order	  evidence).	  	  The	  oracle	  then	  comes	  down	  from	  the	  heavens	  and	  tells	  me	  the	  following:	  “Whenever	  you	  get	  strong	  meteorological	  evidence	  that	  it’s	  going	  to	  rain	  tomorrow,	  you	  become	  so	  depressed	  that	  you	  end	  up	  inventing	  very	  silly	  arguments	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  will	  be	  sunny.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  you	  get	  strong	  meteorological	  evidence	  that	  it	  will	  be	  sunny,	  your	  fear	   of	   disappointment	   leads	   to	   your	   judging	   that	   it	   will	   be	   rainy!”	   	   In	   this	   case,	   my	   expected	   degree	   of	  reliability	  will	  be	  close	  to	  zero	  (for	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  judgments	  I	  make	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  
alone	   are	  anti-­‐reliable).	   	   So,	   according	   to	  E-­‐calibrationism,	   the	   rational	   credence	   in	   the	  proposition	  that	  the	  
first	  order	  evidence	  best	  supports	  will	  be	  close	  to	  zero.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  I’ll	  think	  that	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  best	  supports	  is	  probably	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  will	  rain,	  since	  I	  judged	  it	  will	  be	  sunny.	  	  So,	  if	  I	  accept	  E-­‐calibrationism,	  I’ll	  think	  that	  the	  rational	  credence	  function	  is	  one	  that	  assigns	  a	  very	  low	  credence	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  will	  rain.	  	  But	  I,	  of	  course,	  should	  prefer	  to	  adopt	  a	  credence	  function	  that	  assigns	  a	  
high	  credence	   to	   the	   proposition	   that	   it	  will	   rain	   since	   rain	   is,	   after	   all,	   is	  what	   I	   think	   the	  meteorological	  evidence	  best	   supports!	   	  Thus	   if	   offered	  a	   choice	  between	  adopting	   a	  high	   credence	   in	   rain	  or	   the	   rational	  credence	  in	  rain,	  I’d	  prefer	  to	  adopt	  the	  high	  credence	  in	  rain,	  thereby	  violating	  RatPref.	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(though	   frequently	   these	   two	   things	   go	   together).32	  For	   example,	   it	   might	   be	   that	   the	  vacation	   plan	   that	   is	   best	   to	   conform	   to	   is	   one	   in	   which	   I	   fly	   a	   spaceship	   to	   the	   moon.	  	  Nonetheless,	  that	  is	  surely	  not	  the	  best	  plan	  to	  make,	  even	  if	  it	  psychologically	  possible	  for	  me	   to	  make	   such	   a	   plan.	   To	   see	  why	   the	   plan	   to	   go	   to	   the	  moon	   is	   a	   bad	   plan	   to	  make,	  consider	  what	  I	  expect	  will	  occur	  if	  I	  make	  the	  plan	  to	  go	  to	  the	  moon.	  Perhaps	  I	  will	  spend	  my	  vacation	  filing	  various	  petitions	  and	  requests	  with	  NASA.	  	  Or	  maybe	  I’ll	  try	  (and	  fail)	  to	  build	  a	  spaceship.	   	  Or	  perhaps	  I’ll	   just	  realize	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  I’ll	  be	  able	  to	  fly	  a	  spaceship	   to	   the	   moon	   and,	   since	   I’ll	   have	   made	   no	   other	   plans,	   I’ll	   spend	   the	   week	  brooding	   at	   home.	  But	  whatever	   I	   think	   the	   expected	   consequences	  of	  making	   the	  moon	  plan	  are,	  plausibly,	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  making	  a	  plan	  to	  go	  to,	  say,	  Paris	  is	  higher.	  	  	  Note	  that	  not	  all	  plans	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  succeed	  are	  bad	  plans.	  	  I	  may	  plan	  to	  quit	  smoking	  even	  if	  I	  think	  I’m	  unlikely	  to	  succeed.	  This	  might	  be	  because	  I	  think	  there’s	  some	  
chance	  I’ll	  succeed	  and,	  even	  if	  I	  don’t,	  I’ll	  end	  up	  smoking	  less	  than	  I	  would	  if	  I	  didn’t	  make	  this	  plan.	  	  You	  might	  think	  that	  we	  can	  even	  make	  plans	  that	  we’d	  prefer	  not	  to	  conform	  to.	  	  For	   example,	   if	   I	   am	   always	   running	   half	   an	   hour	   late,	   and	   I	  want	   to	   leave	  my	   house	   at	  10:30,	  I	  will	  plan	  to	  leave	  at	  10.	  	  This	  is	  not	  because	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  leave	  at	  10.	  	  It’s	  because	  I	   think	  that	  the	  result	  of	  planning	   to	   leave	  at	  10	  will	  be	   leaving	  at	  10:30,	  and	  
that	  is	  a	  desirable	  outcome.	  	   One	  might	  take	  a	  similar	  stance	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  various	  epistemic	  plans	  –	  plans	  about	  how	   to	   form	  beliefs.	   	  You	  might	  be	  more	   interested	   in	   the	  expected	   accuracy	   of	   the	   beliefs	   you	   would	   form	   as	   a	   result	   of	   having	   made	   a	   certain	  
epistemic	  plan	  than	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  beliefs	  that	  you	  would	  form	  by	  conforming	  
to	  a	  certain	  epistemic	  plan.	  If	  so,	  you	  might	  think	  of	  the	  rational	  plan	  as	  the	  epistemic	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  make,	  rather	  than	  the	  epistemic	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  follow.	  	   On	   the	   planning	   picture,	   here	   is	   how	   theorizing	   about	   rationality	  would	   proceed:	  one	  thinks	  (a	  priori)	  about	  some	  body	  of	  evidence	  E,	  (or	  some	  evidence	  of	  a	  certain	  type)	  and	  one	  asks	  one’s	  self:	  “what	  should	  my	  belief	  plan	  be	  for	  circumstances	  in	  which	  I	  get	  E?”	  	  Depending	  on	  what	  E	  is,	  when	  you	  are	  considering	  this	  question,	  you	  may	  need	  to	  be	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  of	  the	  plans	  you	  could	  make	  would	  have	  a	  low	  chance	  of	  being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 	  For	   a	   detailed	   argument	   for	   a	   similar	   claim,	   see	   Hedden,	   B.	   “Options	   and	   the	   Subjective	   Ought,”	  
Philosophical	  Studies	  158(2):	  343-­‐360.	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followed.	   In	  engaging	   in	   this	  deliberation,	  one	  considers	   the	   following	  question:	   If	   I	  make	  plan	  P,	  and	  I	  get	  evidence	  E,	  what	  are	  the	  likely	  doxastic	  states	  that	  I	  would	  adopt	  in	  that	  situation,	  and	  how	  accurate	  are	  those	  states	  likely	  to	  be?	  	  	  	   To	   see	   how	   this	  works	   it	  will	   be	   helpful	   to	   have	   a	   concrete	   case	   in	  mind,	   so	   let’s	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  hypoxic	  pilot.	  	  	  Consider	  two	  epistemic	  plans	  about	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  higher	  order	  evidence:	  	  
Right	  Reasons:	  If	  you	  have	  first	  order	  evidence	  E,	  and	  then	  get	  higher	  order	  evidence	  which	  suggests	  that	  your	  expected	  degree	  of	  reliability	  concerning	  whether	  p	  is	  0.5,	  adopt	   the	   credence	   in	   p	   that’s	   rational	   given	   E.	   	   (That	   is,	   ignore	   the	   higher	   order	  evidence).	  
	  
Calibrationism:	   If	   your	   expected	   degree	   of	   reliability	   concerning	  whether	   p	   is	   0.5,	  and	  you	  judge	  that	  p,	  have	  a	  0.5	  credence	  in	  p.	  
	  
Right	  Reasons	  is	  a	  great	  plan	  to	  conform	  to,	  but	   it’s	  not	  a	  good	  plan	  to	  make.	  Since	  you	  know	  that	  you’ll	  be	  impaired	  in	  the	  relevant	  class	  of	  cases,	  you	  can	  predict	  that	  one	  of	  two	  things	  will	  happen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  planning	  to	  do	  what	  Right	  Reasons	  recommends.	  	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  you’ll	  throw	  up	  your	  hands	  and	  think:	  “I	  have	  no	  idea	  what	  the	  principle	  recommends	   in	   this	   case!	   	   I’m	   hypoxic!”	   	   If	   that	   is	   the	   result	   of	  making	   the	   plan,	  maybe	  you’ll	  suspend	  judgment,	  or	  maybe	  you’ll	  pick	  a	  random	  credence	  out	  of	  a	  hat.	  More	  likely,	  perhaps,	  is	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  making	  the	  Right	  Reasons	  plan,	  you	  will	  end	  up	  believing	  the	  propositions	  that	  you	  think	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  supports,	  and	  these	  beliefs	  will,	  despite	  your	  best	  intentions,	  be	  wrong	  50%	  of	  the	  time.	  	  (Practically,	  this	  means	  a	  50%	  chance	  of	  death	   in	   the	   hypoxia	   case!).	   So	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   (and	   the	   expected	   value!)	   of	   the	  results	   of	  planning	   to	   follow	   calibrationism	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   expected	   accuracy	   of	   the	  results	  of	  planning	  to	  have	  the	  attitude	  that	  the	  first	  order	  evidence	  supports.	  	  That	  is,	  one	  should	   assign	   greater	   expected	   accuracy	   to	   the	   belief	   states	   that	   would	   result	   from	  planning	   to	   calibrate	   than	   to	   the	   belief	   states	   that	  would	   result	   from	   planning	   to	   follow	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Right	  Reasons.33	  Thus,	   an	   alternative	  way	   of	   thinking	   about	   how	   rationality	   and	   accuracy	  are	   connected,	   which	   is	   consistent	   with	   and,	   in	   fact,	   motivates	   calibrationism	   is	   the	  following:	  
	  
Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make:	   	   The	   rational	   epistemic	   plan	   is	   the	   one	   that	   a	   rational	   agent	  would	  choose,	  a	  priori,	  if	  she	  were	  aiming	  to	  maximize	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  credences	   an	   agent	   would	   adopt	   as	   a	   result	   of	   making	   the	   plan.	   	   The	   rational	  credences	   given	   a	   body	   of	   evidence	   are	   those	   that	   the	   rational	   epistemic	   plan	  recommends	  given	  that	  	  body	  of	  evidence.	  	  There	  is	  much	  to	  be	  said	  about	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐toMake	  and,	  as	  I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  outset,	   I	  will	  not,	  in	  this	  paper,	  be	  able	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  its	  merits	  or	  its	  problems,	  but	  below	  I	  list	  a	  few	  benefits	  of	  the	  account	  and	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  it	  will	  face.	  
	  
5.	  Benefits	  of	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  
Benefit	  #1:	  Motivating	  Calibrationism	  	  	   As	   I	   mentioned,	   one	   benefit	   of	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	   for	   those	   who	   are	   sympathetic	  with	   calibrationism	   is	   that	   it	   motivates	   calibrationism.	   	   Indeed,	   I	   think	   that	   any	  calibrationist	   who	   favors	   an	   accuracy-­‐driven	   approach	   to	   epistemology	   must	   accept	  something	   like	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make.	   	   For	   on	   accounts	   according	   to	  which	  we	   evaluate	   the	  merits	   of	   a	   principle	   by	   examining	   (even	   a	   priori)	   the	   results	   of	   following	   it,	   rather	   than	  
planning	  to	  follow	  it,	  Right	  Reasons	  will	  be	  preferred.	  	  This	  is	  so	  even	  though	  Right	  Reasons	  (unlike	   the	   principle	   “believe	   the	   truth”)	   makes	   recommendations	   about	   what	   agents	  should	  believe	  as	  a	  function	  of	  their	  evidence	  alone.	  	   A	  nice	  feature	  of	  this	  way	  of	  motivating	  calibrationism	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  rely	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  rationality	  need	  to	  be	  such	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  always	  able	  to	  follow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Robert	  Steel	   (ms.)	   “Peer	  Disagreement,	  Anticipating	  Failure,	  and	  Avoiding	   It”	  adopts	  a	  similar	  strategy	   in	  defending	  conciliatory	  responses	  to	  disagreement.	  	  Maria	  Lasonen-­‐Aarnio	  (2010)	  “Unreasonable	  Knowledge.”	  
Philosophical	   Perspectives	  24(1):1-­‐21	   suggests	   that	   there	   may	   be	   a	   benefit	   to	   having	   the	   dispositions	   that	  accord	  with	  calibrationism.	  	  I	  give	  a	  formal	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  planning	  to	  calibrate	  is	  the	  procedure	  that	  maximizes	   expected	   accuracy	   in	   Schoenfield,	  M.	   (ms.)	   “An	   Accuracy	   Based	   Approach	   to	   Higher	   Order	  Evidence.”	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them.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  rationality	  are	  extremely	  demanding	  and	  difficult.	  All	  that	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  requires	  is	  that	  they	  not	  be	  such,	  that	  there’s	  some	  alternative	  plan,	  from	  which	  we	  can,	  a	  priori,	  expect	  greater	  success.	  	  	  So	   the	   problem	  with	  Right	  Reasons,	   on	   this	   picture,	   isn’t	   that	   it’s	   a	   principle	   that	   agents	  won’t	  successfully	  follow.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  there’s	  a	  principle	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  
Right	  Reasons	  that	  one	  can	  expect,	  a	  priori,	  to	  lead	  to	  greater	  epistemic	  success.	  
	  
Benefit	  #2:	  Planning	  and	  Metaepistemology	  	   Although	   one	   needn’t	   adopt	   any	   particular	   metaepistemological	   theory	   to	   be	  interested	   in	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make,	   recent	   expressivist	   views	   of	   justification	   sit	   nicely	   with	  such	   a	   picture.	   	   Karl	   Schafer34	  for	   example,	   independently	   motivates	   the	   idea	   that,	   in	  claiming	  that	  it’s	  rational	  to	  believe	  p	  give	  E,	  one	  is	  expressing	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  plan	  to	  believe	   p	   if	   given	   evidence	  E.	   	   If	   this	  metaepistemological	   theory	   is	   on	   the	   right	   track,	   it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  endorse	  epistemic	  norms	  that	  constitute	  plans	  that	  are	  good	  to	  make.	  
	  	  
Benefit	  #3:	  Planning	  and	  Epistemic	  Guidance	  The	  plan-­‐making	  account	  sits	  nicely	  with	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  rationality	  should	  be	  guidance	  giving.	   	   Indeed,	  planning	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  giving	  guidance	  to	  your	  future	  self.	  And	  just	  as,	  when	  we	  plan,	  we	  frequently	  focus	  on	  the	  plan	  that’s	  best	  to	  make,	  when	  we	   guide,	  we	   frequently	   focus	   on	   the	   guidance	   that’s	   best	   to	  give	  (rather	   than	   the	  guidance	  that’s	  best	  to	  follow).	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  know	  that	  the	  route	  to	  the	  train	  station	  that	  it	  would	  be	  best	  for	  someone	  to	  take	  involves	  lots	  of	  twists	  and	  turns,	  back	  alleys	  and	  shortcuts.	   	  It’s	  a	  beautiful	  route,	  and	  if	  you	  follow	  it,	  you’ll	  get	  to	  the	  train	  station	  quickly.	  	  But	  if	  I’m	  giving	  directions	  to	  a	  confused	  stranger,	  directing	  her	  to	  follow	  this	  route	  may	  be	  bad	  advice.	   	  This	   is	  because,	  we	  might	   imagine,	   the	  expected	  result	  of	  my	  advising	  her	  to	  take	   the	  scenic	  shortcut	  will	  be	   that	   she’ll	  get	   lost,	   confused,	  and	  miss	  her	   train.	   I	   should	  give	  the	  stranger	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  less	  scenic	  route,	  not	  because	  that’s	  the	  route	  it	  would	  be	   best	   for	   the	   stranger	   to	   take,	   but	   rather,	   because	   I	   can	   expect	   better	   results	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Schafer,	  K.	   (2014)	  “Doxastic	  Planning	  and	  Epistemic	   Internalism”	  Synthese	  191(12):2571-­‐2591.	   	   I	  discuss	  Schafer’s	  view	  and	  the	  role	  that	  planning	  may	  play	  in	  epistemology	  in	  my	  “Internalism	  without	  Luminosity”	  (forthcoming).	  Philosophcal	  Issues.	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advising	  her	  to	  follow	  the	  longer	  uglier	  route,	  than	  from	  advising	  her	  to	  follow	  the	  shorter	  scenic	  route.	  	  	  
	  
6.	  Challenges	  to	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  
Challenge	  #1:	  How	  to	  Know	  What	  to	  Plan?	  It	  may	  be	  unclear	  how	  one	  could	  evaluate	  the	  results	  of	  making	  certain	  plans	  (rather	  than	  following	  them)	  a	  priori.35	  	  After	  all,	  what	  an	  agent	  will	  end	  up	  believing	  as	  a	  result	  of	  making	  various	  plans	  will	  depend	  on	  all	  sorts	  of	  facts	  about	  the	  agent	  that	  Pria	  doesn’t	  have	  access	  to.	  This	  is	  a	  large	  issue	  that	  I	  will	  just	  briefly	  touch	  on.	  I	  think	  that	  what	  the	  defender	  of	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  should	  say	   is	   that	  what	  Pria	  has	  to	  go	  on,	  primarily,	  when	  considering	  which	  principles	  to	  recommend,	   is	  whatever	   information	  about	  the	  agent	   is	  in	  the	  body	  of	  
evidence	   she	   is	  considering.	   	  For	  example,	  Pria’s	  principles	  will	  recommend	  that	  an	  agent	  with	   evidence	   about	   hypoxia	   suspend	   judgment	   because	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   agent	   is	   at	   an	  
altitude	   which	   makes	   her	   unreliable	   is	   included	   in	   the	   body	   of	   evidence	   that	   Pria	   is	  considering.	  Additionally,	  it’s	  not	  necessary	  that	  Pria	  be	  certain	  what	  credence	  function	  an	  agent	  who	  makes	  a	  certain	  plan	  will	  adopt,	  given	  some	  body	  of	  evidence.	  	  To	  calculate	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  making	  a	  plan,	  all	  that’s	  needed	  is	  a	  probability	  distribution	  over	  the	  possible	  credence	  functions	  that	  an	  agent	  who	  has	  that	  evidence	  would	  adopt	  as	  a	  result	  of	  having	  made	  the	  plan.	  	  I	   suspect	   that	   calibrationists,	   at	   least,	   will	   be	   happy	   with	   this	   result.	   	   For	  calibrationists	   frequently	   point	   out	   that	   their	   view	   isn’t	   about	   what	   agents	   with	   limited	  capacities	   should	   believe;	   their	   view	   is	   about	   what	   agents	   with	   evidence	   about	   having	  limited	   capacities	   should	   believe.	   	   Thus,	   the	   only	   thing	   that	   will	   be	   relevant,	   from	   the	  calibrationist’s	  perspective,	  is	  what	  evidence	  the	  agent	  has	  about	  her	  own	  capacities.	  	  And	  this	   is	   precisely	   the	   sort	   of	   information	   that	   Pria	  will	   be	   able	   to	   take	   into	   account	  when	  considering	  which	  plans	  are	  best	  to	  make.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Thanks	  to	  Tom	  Kelly	  for	  raising	  this	  question.	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Challenge	  #2:	  Worries	  about	  Epistemic	  Consequentialism	  	   One	  might	  worry	  that	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	  is	  going	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  worries	  having	  to	  do	  with	  the	  consequentialist	  spirit	  of	  the	  proposal.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  an	  agent	  receives	  evidence	  E,	  which	  entails	  (obviously)	  that	  p,	  but	  she	  also	  has	  evidence	  that	  tells	  her	  that	  if	  she	  believes	  ~p,	  God	  will	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  of	  her	  other	  beliefs	  are	  true.	  Wouldn’t	  the	  best	  plan	   to	  make	  be	  one	   in	  which	   she	  believes	  ~p?	  But	   surely	   it	   is	  epistemically	  irrational	  to	  believe	   ~p	   in	   such	   circumstances!	   	   One	   might	   respond	   by	   adding	   constraints	   that	   will	  forbid	   tradeoffs	   between	   one’s	   attitudes	   towards	   different	   propositions,	   or	   tradeoffs	  between	  one’s	   attitudes	   at	   different	   times.	   	   But	   recent	  papers	  by	   Selim	  Berker,36	  Michael	  Caie,37	  Jennifer	   Carr38	  and	   Hilary	   Greaves39	  pose	   challenges	   to	   epistemic	   consequentialist	  frameworks,	  which	  they	  think	  will	  apply	  even	  once	  such	  restrictions	  are	  in	  place.	  	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  challenges	  here.	  	  All	  I	  want	  to	  say	  is	  that,	  as	  the	  authors	  above	  point	   out,	   these	   challenges	   are	   challenges	   to	   the	   recent	   accuracy	   driven	   approach	   to	  epistemology	   in	  general.	  My	  aim	  here	   is	  not	   to	  defend	  “accuracy-­‐first”	  epistemology	   from	  such	   challenges	   but	   to	   compare	   different	  ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   how	   such	   an	   approach	  might	  be	  developed.40	  	  
	  
Challenge	  #3:	  	  Is	  that	  All	  Rationality	  Amounts	  to?	  You	  might	  worry	   that	   if	   epistemic	   rationality	   is	  what	  Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make	   says	   it	   is,	  rationality	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  serve	  many	  of	  the	  purposes	  we	  may	  have	  wanted	  it	  to	  serve.	  	  This	   is	  because	  we	  don’t	  only	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  rationality	   in	  the	  context	  of	   first	  personal	  deliberation	  and	  planning.	  Furthermore,	  many	  nice	  principles	  we	  might	  have	  wanted	  (for	  example,	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref,	  probabilism,	  conditionalization41)	  may	  not	  be	  vindicated	  by	  such	  an	  account.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Berker,	  S.	  (2013).	  "Epistemic	  Teleology	  and	  the	  Separateness	  of	  Propositions,"	  Philosophical	  Review	  122:	  337-­‐393.	  37	  Caie,	  M.	  (2013).	  “Rational	  Probabilistic	  Incoherence,”	  Philosophical	  Review	  122	  (4):527-­‐575.	  38	  Carr,	  op.	  cit.	  39	  Greaves,	  op.	  cit.	  40	  For	  a	  response	  to	  the	  consequentialist	  challenges	  see,	  for	  example,	  Konek,	  and	  Levinstein	  op.	  cit.	  
41 	  Calibrationism,	   which	   is	   motivated	   by	   Best-­‐Plan-­‐to-­‐Make,	   will	   arguably	   be	   inconsistent	   with	   both	  probabilism	  and	  conditionalization	  since	   it	  will	   sometimes	  require	  agents	   to	  have	   low	  confidence	   in	   logical	  truths	  and	  in	  propositions	  that	  their	  evidence	  entails.	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I	  want	  to	  end	  by	  suggesting	  that	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  have	  our	  cake	  and	  eat	  it	  too.	  	  We	  can	   imagine	  Pria,	  up	   in	   rationality	  heaven,	   creating	   two	  epistemic	  plans.	   	   She	   creates	   the	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  follow,	  and	  she	  creates	  the	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  make.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  word	  “rational”	   is	   ambiguous	   between	   these	   two	  plans,	   and	  which	  plan	  we’re	   interested	   in,	   in	  some	  particular	  instance,	  depends	  on	  our	  purpose.	  	  If	  we’re	  in	  the	  business	  of	  planning	  how	  to	  go	  about	  forming	  beliefs	  from	  a	  first	  personal	  perspective,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  plan	  that’s	  best	  to	  make.	  	  But	  it	  may	  be	  that,	  for	  other	  purposes,	  the	  relevant	  norms	  are	  those	  that	  make	  up	  the	  epistemic	  plan	  that	  one	  would	  regard,	  a	  priori,	  as	  best	  to	  follow.	  RatPref	  and	  TotPref,	  it	  turns	  out,	  are	  true	  when	  we’re	  thinking	  about	  rationality	  as	  the	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  follow	  but	  not	  the	  plan	  that	  is	  best	  to	  make.	  On	  this	  blended	  approach,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  answer	  to	  the	  constitutive	  question.	  	  There	  are	  two	  important	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  epistemic	   plan	   can	   be	   motivated	   by	   accuracy-­‐based	   considerations,	   and	   two	   notions	   of	  rationality	  corresponding	  to	  our	  interest	  in	  each	  of	  these	  plans.	  
	  
7.	  Conclusion	  	   I	   began	   by	   posing	   three	   questions:	   why	   should	   we	   prefer	   rational	   credences	   to	  irrational	  ones,	  why	  should	  we	  prefer	  the	  credences	  rationalized	  by	  our	  total	  evidence	  to	  those	   rationalized	   by	   a	   proper	   subset	   of	   it,	   and	  what,	   if	   anything,	   can	   be	   said	   about	   the	  connection	  that	  rationality	  bears	  to	  accuracy?	  	  I	  argued	  that	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  answers	  these	  questions	   can	  be	   given	   if	  we	  accept	   the	  view	   that	   the	   rational	   credences	   are	   those	  recommended	  by	  the	  plan	  that	  one	  would	  regard,	  a	  priori,	  as	  the	  best	  plan	  to	  follow.	  I	  then	  showed	   that	   calibrationism	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   this	   picture	   and	   some	   of	   the	   claims	   it	  motivated.	   This	   left	   us	   with	   a	   puzzle:	   how	   is	   the	   calibrationist	   thinking	   about	   the	  connection	  between	  rationality	  and	  accuracy?	  	  	  I	  suggested	  an	  account	  on	  which	  what’s	  important,	  for	  rationality,	  isn’t	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  following	  a	  plan.	  	  Instead,	  what	  we’re	  interested	  in	  is	  the	  expected	  accuracy	  of	  the	  results	  of	  making	  a	  plan.	   	  Although	  this	  view	  has	  some	  attractive	  features,	  it	  also	  faces	  some	  challenges	  and	  may	  fail	  to	  capture	  everything	  that	  we	  find	  valuable	  about	  epistemic	  rationality.	   	   So,	   rather	   than	  abandoning	   the	  original	   claim	  about	   the	   connection	  between	  rationality	   and	   accuracy,	   we	   might	   instead	   recognize	   that	   there	   are	   two	   interesting	  
	   28	  
epistemic	  notions	  that	  serve	  two	  distinct	  roles:	  there	  is	  the	  plan	  that	  one	  should	  regard	  a	  priori	   as	   best	   to	   follow,	   and	   the	   plan	   that	   one	   should	   regard	   a	   priori	   as	   best	   to	  make.	   	   I	  believe	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  plans,	  and	  their	  importance,	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  higher	  order	  evidence.	  
